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Recent literature has suggested that higher taxes on addictive goods could increase welfare by assisting
individuals with self control problems and trouble resisting ‘temptation’.  In contrast, if individuals
continue to use despite increased prices, taxation may serve to reduce the welfare of these individuals
while providing no benefits in managing self control nor mitigating externalities. We use data on adolescents
from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) to examine the impact of
tobacco taxes on smoking.  To account for unobserved heterogeneity in response to taxes we estimate
finite mixture models, positing two types of individuals with differential responses to taxes. We find
evidence of differential price elasticity for tobacco use across the adolescents groups, and show that
individuals with low self control or high discount rates are largely unresponsive to cigarette price.
Those who have the least willpower may need the most help in quitting but are unresponsive to taxes,
suggesting that policies other than taxation may be needed to reduce adolescent tobacco use.
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Tobacco use is one of the leading causes of mortality and morbidy, including an 
estimated 400,000 annual deaths attributed to smoking and over 8.5 million Americans 
who live with a serious disease caused by tobacco use (Giovino 2007).  A typical 
economic policy prescription to reduce tobacco use is to increase cigarette prices.  While 
there has generally been strong evidence of behavioral responses to cigarette prices, 
recent research suggests more nuanced results for many types of addictive  goods.  For 
example, for adult alcohol use, Manning et al. (1995) show that heavy drinkers and light 
drinkers are less price sensitive than moderate drinkers.  Ayyagari et al. (2009) also show 
that light drinkers have an elastic demand for alcohol while heavier drinkers are 
unresponsive to taxes for older aged individuals, suggesting an important deadweight 
loss.  For tobacco use, authors have found lower responses for the poor (Farrelly and 
Bray 1998), girls (Lewit et al. 1997), women (Chaloupka and Warner 2001), whites teens 
(DeCicca et al. 2000) and younger teens (Gruber 2000). There is considerable evidence 
that the elasticity of smoking participation is larger for youth than adults (Glied 2003, 
Farrelly and Bray 1998).  However, DeCicca et al. (2002) present evidence of a small 
role for price in youth smoking initiation.   
These papers relate to an emerging literature that extends earlier models of 
rational addiction to incorporate ideas of self control and cue-triggered behaviors.  
Importantly, these new models that focus on the demand for addictive goods lead to stark 
differences in policy prescriptions.  Models focusing on time-inconsistency, where 
current and future-selves make different “optimal” consumption choices, often clearly 
suggest that there are welfare benefits of increasing “sin taxes,” which can be used as a 
method of reducing the problems of self control (Gruber and Koszegi 2001, 2004).  In 
particular, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) suggest that the intrapersonal externalities 
(“internalities”) associated with smoking may be 100 times the costs of the externalities.  
In contrast, recent theoretical work by Bernheim and Rangel (2004 and 2006) posits an 
important role of cue-triggered use of addictive goods, and “hot’ and “cold” states 
leading to consumption implies that taxes on these goods may not result in behavioral 
change and are likely to be welfare reducing.
1  Further, Bernheim and Rangel posit two 
                                                 
1 See Viscusi (2002-3) for a critique of this line of research.    
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types of consumption, rational and irrational consumption driven by cues. Gul and 
Pesendorfer (2004) also offer a behavioral economics model of addiction focusing on the 
temptation and inability to resist. They also conclude that taxes on addictive goods can 
harm welfare.  
  In this paper, we use finite mixture models to examine whether there is evidence 
of differential cigarette tax elasticities using a national sample of adolescents.  We find 
evidence of a large group of adolescents who are sensitive, but a smaller group who are 
largely unresponsive.  We then show evidence that measures of self control and discount 
horizons available in the data are strongly related to membership in the “unresponsive” 
group.  Additionally we control for family fixed effects and show the relationships to be 
qualitatively similar—siblings with low self control or high discounting are more likely 
to be unresponsive to tobacco prices than their sister or brother.  These results suggest 
that, for teenagers, taxation alone is unlikely to lead to substantial reductions in tobacco 
use. Further, the results are consistent with the cue-triggered theories of addiction 
suggesting that additional policies selected might best be based on this model.   While we 
cannot test the validity of the alternative underlying models, we provide some 
provocative evidence consistent with behavioral economic models on self-control. 
  We add to the literature in several dimensions. Most importantly we provide 
evidence relevant to the efficiency of cigarette taxation as applied to youths. We extend 
the empirical literature to the assessment of the relevance of behavioral economics 
models that focus on self control problems as a contributing factor in tobacco 
consumptions by youths tempted to smoke. Use of the finite mixture model allows us to 
examine the roles of self control and discount in delineating the two latent groups. 
  
Background Literature 
An extensive literature has contributed to our understanding of the demand for 
addictive goods.  By the 1980s, the principal focus of this literature was on models of 
habit formation, where current consumption is predicted to be a function of past 
consumption choices (Gruber and Koszegi 2001; see Chaloupka and Warner 2001 for a 
review).  Becker and Murphy (1988) shifted the focus towards notions of “rational 
addiction,” where individuals are assumed to recognize the long run tradeoffs between  
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current consumption and future consumption due to increases in the stock of the addictive 
good and make rational decisions on consumption levels of addictive goods.  Empirical 
tests of the Becker-Murphy framework have often been positive, but these tests are often 
difficult to interpret (Gruber and Koszegi 2000). Falsification tests have cast doubt on the 
rational addiction models (Auld and Grootendorst 2004). 
More recently, researchers have developed models that build on rational choice 
but incorporate “mistakes” of some kind into the determinants of consuming addictive 
goods.  Gruber and Koszegi (2001) extend the literature by allowing individuals to have 
time-inconsistent preferences.  The authors suggest two key features of time-inconsistent 
individuals:  (1) inability to achieve desired future levels of smoking due to a present bias 
and (2) the use of commitment devices or self-control techniques to overcome this 
problem.  Lack of will power or self control may be particularly relevant for adolescents.  
For example, 56% of high school seniors who smoke contend that they will not still be 
smoking in five years but only 31% end up quitting in that time frame (US Department of 
Health and Human Resources, 1994).  Additional suggestive evidence of time-
inconsistent behavior is the large number of attempted quits—38 of the 46 million 
smokers in 1993 had attempted to quit (Harris 1993).  An alternative direction in models 
of the demand for addictive goods is from Bernheim and Rangel (2004), who, instead of 
time-consistency, focus on “hot” and “cold” states and cue-triggers that lead to 
consuming addictive goods.  As stated above, Gul and Pesendorfer focus on temptation. 
 Distinctions  between  the  causes of addictive consumption have been shown to 
have important implications with regard to tax policy.  Gruber and Koszegi (2001) and 
O’Donahue and Rabin (2006) each suggest that taxes could act as a self-control device 
for smokers; those who are sophisticated about their self control problems and responsive 
to prices would support higher taxes. Indeed, Gruber and Koszegi suggest the optimal tax 
on cigarettes is likely at least 50 percent higher than existing tax rates and may be as high 
as $30 per pack.
2 
3  In subsequent analysis, Gruber and Koszegi (2004) show evidence 
                                                 
2 The authors also provide a rationale for “overregulating” youth smoking.  In their working paper, Gruber 
and Koszegi (2000) note that for individuals who are naïve about their self control problems, an even 
higher tax may be warranted because it could assist the self-control problem and a “misperception 
problem”, where the misperception is whether the individual will become addicted with use of the good.  
The authors therefore recommend a “cautious paternalism” for individuals who know they have self control  
  5
that taxes on cigarettes may be either progressive or regressive depending on whether low 
income individuals have small short term discount factors (less regressive) or lower long 
term discount factor (more regressive).
4  Hersh (2005) too finds that smokers desire taxes 
as a precommitment device. 
Alternatively, Bernheim and Rangel (2004, 2006) argue that, for some addictive 
goods, consumption decisions are driven by a visceral motivation—a short circuiting of 
the rational decision making process, which implies little or no price sensitivity for these 
decisions.  To the extent that the cue based scenario is underlying demand, sin taxes may 
not be optimal but rather would be regressive.  Bernheim and Rangel (2004) suggest that 
a subsidy on addictive goods could be welfare improving if consumption tends to be 
“spur of the moment” but where the intention to consume the good becomes increasingly 
important as the stock of the addictive good increases.  Taxation may be beneficial for 
inexpensive addictive goods that individuals regularly use and where individuals 
typically attempt to quit after cue triggers are established.  This would describe smoking- 
small repeated purchases with a majority of smokers wishing that they could quit. Gul 
and Pesendorfer (2004) also conclude, based on a model of temptation and addiction, that 
taxes on addictive goods can harm welfare
5.  
The impact of sin taxes on the population of youths depends not only on the 
underlying model of demand, but also on the responsiveness of demand to taxes. If much 
of the population is responsive to taxes and there are important externalities or 
internalities, then welfare could be enhanced by increasing taxes.  However, if a 
significant proportion is unresponsive, the welfare gains would be mitigated.  
Heterogeneity in self control of individuals may account for potential differences in 
responsiveness to taxes. For some, self control may be least available in ‘hot’ states 
                                                                                                                                                 
problems and a “short leashed” policy for those who do not know they have a self control problem.  An 
underlying assumption, though, is that naifs respond to price similarly to other individuals.   
3 O’Donahue and Rabin (2006, p 1835) caveat their analysis by stating that if people with self-control 
problems do not respond to tax increases, then a sin tax would merely redistribute income away from these 
individuals without any corresponding benefits.   
4 Gruber and Koszegi (2004) show that individuals in the lowest income quartiles are most sensitive to 
cigarette prices (-1.1) and those in the highest quartile are least sensitive (-.0.38).  They also find 
differences by consumption quartiles and education groups, with higher elasticities for low consumption 
and education groups.   
5 Other areas of ongoing related research include psychologists that are making strides in teaching self 
control (Muraven and Baumeister 2000, Mischel and Mischel, 1983, Mischel et al. 1996).   
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motivated by cues to desire to smoke. We suggest that heterogeneity in demand extends 
beyond simple differences in addiction to include differences in self control as well. 
 The behavioral economics literature has opened up opportunities to consider 
taxation not only as a mechanism to raise revenue and target externalities, but also to help 
people who want help controlling their consumption of addictive goods. Behavioral 
economics literature on ‘asymmetric paternalism’ (Cameron et al, 2003) ‘optimal 
paternalism (O’Donaghue and Rabin (2003) and others (Bernheim et al 2005) has opened 
the way for economists to consider self-control issues in discussions of optimal tax 
policy.  Applications of these concepts to youths may not be as controversial as when 
applied to adults as there is a common belief, and evidence (see above), that youths are 
not yet able to perfectly assess and balance short run gains versus long run costs.   
  In this paper, we build on the behavioral economics literature on addiction to 
conduct empirical analyses of adolescents to examine whether there are “types” of 
adolescents who differentially respond to cigarettes taxes.  We then attempt to tie these 
“types” with individual characteristics such as self control and time preference in 
assessing whether cigarette taxation curbs self control problems or whether taxation is 




The data for this study come from the confidential version of the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).  Add Health is a school-based, 
longitudinal study of the health-related behaviors of adolescents and their outcomes in 
young adulthood. Beginning with an in-school questionnaire administered to a nationally 
representative sample of students in grades 7 through 12 in 1994-95, the study follows up 
with a series of in-home interviews of students approximately one year and then six years 
later.  Other sources of data include questionnaires for parents, siblings, fellow students, 
and school administrators. By design, the Add Health survey included a sample stratified 
                                                 
6 It should be stressed that the differentiation of individuals into “types” is based on low-dimensional, 
latent factors.  We are able to provide evidence of some of the complex characteristics of the factors but 
cannot provide a complete characterization.   Similarly, in describing the latent groups, we can use key 




by region, urbanicity, school type, ethnic mix, and size.  Preexisting databases (e.g. 
census data) have been linked with the individuals in the sample and provide information 
about neighborhoods and communities.
7   
We use the first wave of data because cigarette taxes have been appended at the 
state level only to this wave and to focus on adolescents.   For our tobacco use measure, 
we use the answer to the following question: “During the past 30 days, on the days you 
smoked, how many cigarettes did you smoke each day?    The tax measure that is 
included in the first wave of data is the state-level excise tax on cigarettes (per pack, in 
cents) in 1995.  Full descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.   
We follow DeCicca et al. (2002) and other authors by using a standard set of 
control variables in our analysis, including age, gender, race, family income, parental 
education and employment, family structure, religiosity, and urban/rural status.  In 
Appendix Table 1A, we present descriptive statistics for the sibling sample used later in 
the analysis.  While there are several statistically significant differences in the descriptive 
statistics between the full and the sibling sample, few differences are large in magnitude.     
We estimate the posterior odds of group (“type”) composition as a function of a 
set of socio-economic variables as well as the proxies for self-control and individual’s 
discount rate.   For our measure of self control, we follow Nagin and Pogarsky (2004) 
and use the answer to, “When making decisions, you usually go with your gut feeling 
without thinking too much about the consequences of each alternative.”  This question 
proxies for impulsivity, which psychologists posit is akin to self-control or will power.  
The answers include five categories from “strongly agree” through “strongly disagree” 
(the neutral response is the omitted category).  For our proxy measure of discounting the 
future
8, we again follow Nagin and Pogarsky (2004) and use the answer to, “What do you 
think are the chances that you will live to age 35?” The answers include five categories:  
“almost no chance” “some chance, but probably not” “50-50 chance” “good chance” and 
“almost certain” (the omitted category).   The distributions of these measures are also 
presented in Table 1.   
Empirical Models  
                                                 
7 See Harris (2008) for full description of the Add Health data set.   
8 While this measure is likely useful to characterize time preference/discounting due to uncertainty over 
future mortality, we lack a measure of present bias.    
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We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the relationship between cigarette 
taxes at the state level and cigarette consumption.  Specifically, we estimate several 
baseline specifications, including OLS, Poisson, and negative binomial regressions, to 
examine the tax response where the number of cigarettes consumed is the outcome of 
interest and we situate individuals (i) in schools (s) in states (g)
9: 
  isg is g isg X tax cigarettes ε β α + + = ) log(       (1) 
Next, we examine whether there is evidence for differential price responses by 
using finite mixture models.  Finite mixture models have received increasing attention in 
the statistics literature mainly because of the number of areas in which such distributions 
are encountered (see McLachlan and Peel, 2000, and Lindsay, 1995, for numerous 
applications and descriptions of statistical properties). Econometric applications of finite 
mixture models include the seminal work of Heckman and Singer (1984) to labor 
economics, Wedel, et al. (1993) to marketing data, El-Gamal and Grether (1995) to data 
from experiments in decision making under uncertainty, and Deb and Trivedi (1997, 
2002) to the economics of healthcare. 
Although, OLS and Poisson regressions can be used to model differential price 
responses by observed covariates, they cannot identify differential responses by 
unobserved characteristics. In the case of cigarette smoking, it is plausible to believe that 
adolescents can be categorized into “types” on the basis of their level of self control, 
discount rates and related decision-making characteristics. Further, it is reasonable to 
analyze whether responses to prices vary by these unobserved types. In the finite mixture 
model, the random variable y is postulated as a draw from a population which is an 
additive mixture of C distinct classes or subpopulations in proportions π j  such that 
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where the 
th j density ( | ), 1,..., = ji j f yjC θ  is specified as a negative binomial density (see 
Deb and Trivedi 1997, for the formula for the density) and θj  is the associated set of 
parameters.  The conditional mean for each component is specified as 
                                                 
9 In our analyses, robust standard errors, clustered at the state-level, are reported.  
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 ( | ) exp( log( ) ) α β =+ isg j g is j E cigarettes j tax X . (4) 
The finite mixture models are estimated using maximum likelihood. Inference is based on 
cluster-corrected robust standard errors. 
We use our finite mixture parameter estimates to calculate the posterior 
probability of being in each of the latent classes.  Although the models assume that the 
prior (unconditional) probability of class membership is constant across observations, we 
can use Bayes Theorem to calculate the posterior probability of membership in each 
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Thus, the posterior probability varies across observations.  We use the estimated posterior 
probabilities to explore the determinants of class membership (“type”). 
While we believe that finite mixture models are a natural way to examine our 
research question, two potentially attractive alternative econometric strategies are worth 
discussing:  the use of quantile regression methods to examine heterogeneous responses, 
and the use of two-part models to deal with the large fraction of zeros (current non-
smokers).  As discussed above, quantile regressions have been used in similar contexts to 
study heterogeneous responses to treatments, however they have two limitations vis-à-vis 
finite mixture models.  First, quantile regressions are not well behaved in the context of 
count data.  Second, although quantile regression methods may detect heterogeneous 
responses, they provide no way to characterize the source of the heterogeneity.  Whereas 
in our application of FMM, we can provide suggestive evidence of the observable 
characteristics of the different “types” of individuals who respond differentially to 
cigarette taxes.   
Two-part models are ubiquitous in the health economics literature and are often 
used in order to deal with potential heterogeneity between users and non-users when the 
distribution of the outcome includes a substantial fraction of zeros.  Although our data  
include a substantial fraction of zeros, the two-part model is less attractive than the finite 
mixture for two reasons.  First, the two-part model may be thought of as a special case of 
the finite mixture model in which one of the components has a degenerate distribution at  
  10
zero.  Second, if some adolescents are occasional smokers who go back and forth 
between not smoking and light smoking, the distinction between use and non-use may be 
less attractive than the distinction between low and high use, which is the distinction that 
the finite mixture model makes.
10 
    
Results 
 Following the standard approach in the literature, the first set of estimates of the 
tax elasticity are all single equation specifications. Results are displayed for OLS, 
Poisson and Negative Binomial estimation methods. The OLS results shown in column 1 
of table 2 suggest that a 100% tax increase would reduce the number of cigarettes by 0.19 
per day.  Recall the mean number of cigarettes smoked is 1.7 per day.  Other results in 
column one table 2 are consistent with prior literature—black and Hispanic students 
smoke fewer cigarettes than white students.  Males smoke more than females, and 
students from more advantaged families (higher family income and  mother’s education; 
married parents) smoke fewer cigarettes.   
Next, since our outcome is a count variable, we estimate a Poisson specification 
in column 2 and negative binomial specifications in column 3 to better fit the large 
number of individuals who do not smoke (approximately 75%)—the latter specification 
can better handle overdispersion found in the outcome measure.  Model selection criteria 
show the superiority of the negative binomial specification over the Poisson.  We find 
results similar to those obtained using OLS, although a 100% tax increase reduces the 
number of cigarettes by 0.09 cigarettes per day in the Poisson results and a reduction of 
0.11 cigarettes per day in the negative binomial results. Covariates in these latter two sets 
of estimates have similar effects to that of the OLS. Overall, our baseline results are 
consistent with prior literature, but like much previous research, these results do not 
consider the possibility of differential price responses based on adolescent “types”. 
  In our next set of results shown in Table 3, we examine whether there is evidence 
for differential price responses to taxes by using finite mixture models.  Our results 
suggest the presence of two “types” or latent classes of adolescents.  We present results 
                                                 
10 DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2008) also point out that in most applications of two-part models of 
tobacco use, researchers examine current participation as a function of current price;  however current 
participation reflects a series of past decisions and is likely  be more appropriately linked to past prices.    
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for two mixture models, a specification that uses a poisson distribution and a 
specification that uses a negative binomial distribution.  Bayesian information criterion 
results suggest that the negative binomial model is preferred
11.  In particular the negative 
binomial model shows evidence for differential responses to cigarette prices—a large 
class of adolescents (over 85%) are light smokers, with 0.29 cigarettes smoked per day, 
and react to a 100% increase in taxes by reducing consumption by nearly 0.2 cigarettes.  
For the second “type” of adolescents, who are relatively heavy smokers (over 5 cigarettes 
per day), the effect of the cigarette tax is to reduce consumption by less than 1/3 the 
amount of the first “types”.  Thus, our results strongly suggest two “types” of adolescents 
who have quite different responses to one prominent public policy aimed at reducing 
tobacco use by youths. 
  Our next goal is to provide suggestive evidence regarding which attributes 
separate adolescents into types, with a particular focus on self control and time 
preference.  In Table 4, we use OLS specifications to examine the determinants of being 
classified as the second, “unresponsive type” seen in Table 3.  In column 1, we non-
parametrically include our proxy measure of self control—the degree of making 
decisions by “going with your gut.”  Individuals who neither agree nor disagree with this 
question are the omitted group.  The results suggest a strong positive relationship 
between this measure of self-control and being allocated to component 2—individuals 
with lower self control seems to be unresponsive to cigarette taxes.  Similarly,  
coefficients on the  proxy for time preference—the respondent’s prediction of surviving 
to age 35— suggest that individuals who do not expect to live past 35 are less likely to 
respond to cigarette taxes when deciding their cigarette consumption. These results are 
displayed in column 2.  In column 3, we enter both the self control and time preference 
proxies and confirm both that low self control and high discount rate result in being 
classified in the “unresponsive group.”  The results are robust.  Since we have shown that 
the “unresponsive type” of adolescent are also relatively heavy smokers, in column 4, we 
                                                 
11 We also estimated models that allowed for a third “type” in the mixture models.  The results for the 
poisson specification are presented in the appendix.  The BIC suggests that the three-component poisson 
model is preferred to the two-component model in Table 3.  However, the two-component negative 
binomial model is preferred to both poisson models.  Finally, we attempted to estimated three-component 
negative binomial models, but these specifications failed to converge.  Model comparisons are also 
presented in Table 2A in the appendix  
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also control for cigarette use and show that the magnitude of the results are reduced 
somewhat for our self control and time preference measures, although the results are 
qualitatively similar and still significant.  These results suggest that self control and time 
preference do not purely operate through heavy tobacco use.  This implies that while the 
degree of addiction could account for part of the delineation into groups, it is only one of 
several factors. 
  In columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, we re-estimate the specification in column 3 but 
limit the sample to siblings and twins in the data. Although the siblings and twins sample 
is smaller, comparing column 3 and column 5, the results suggest that moving to the 
sibling sample does not alter the associations shown in the full sample.  Finally, in 
column 6 we estimate specifications with family fixed effects in order to control shared 
family background in terms of nurture and nature, including 50% or more of genetic 
endowments.  Even with these additional controls, we find, within-families, that the 
sibling who has lower self control is less responsive to prices when making cigarette 
consumption decisions than their brother or sister with higher self control.  The results for 
the time preference variable are also qualitatively similar within sibling pairs but are 
insignificant.
12   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  We add to the literature in several dimensions. Most importantly we provide 
evidence relevant to the efficiency of tobacco taxation as applied to youths. We extend 
the empirical literature on taxation to behavioral economics models and factors such as 
self control. In particular we find that self control proxies are contributing factors in 
tobacco consumption by youths tempted to smoke. Access to a nationally representative 
sample with psychological measures and use of the finite mixture model allows us to 
examine the roles of self control and discount in delineating the two latent groups.  
Despite the strengths of this paper, there are, of course, limitations. Key among 
them may be our inability to measure what physiologists mean to capture by self control, 
will power or impulsivity. We are constrained by the measures available in Add Health. 
                                                 
12 We show in the appendix similar results for the two-component poisson model.    
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None-the-less, we believe that this examination of these concepts paves the way for 
future studies that better capture the concept of lack of will power.  
  Our results using finite mixture models suggest that there is a large group of 
adolescents who are sensitive to price, but a smaller group who are largely unresponsive 
to increased prices.  We then show that proxy measures of self control and discounting 
are strongly related to membership in the “unresponsive” group.   Our results are 
qualitatively robust across specification, including controlling for family fixed effects. 
Even given a shared upbringing, siblings with low self control or high discounting are 
more likely to be unresponsive to tobacco prices than their sister or brother.  These results 
suggest, for teenagers, that taxation alone is unlikely to lead to substantial reductions in 
tobacco.  Further, the results are consistent with the cue-triggered theories of addiction 
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Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample 
Add Health Wave 1 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std  Dev  Min  Max 
Number of Cigarettes  20619 1.71 5.03 0  95
Cigarette Tax  20497 32.88 16.24 2.5  75
Vending Machine Ban  20497 0.84 0.36 0  1
Age 20602 16.15 1.74 12  21
Male 20619 0.49 0.50 0  1
Black 20619 0.23 0.42 0  1
Hispanic 20619 0.17 0.38 0  1
Family Income ($10,000s)  20619 45.15 39.23 0  990
Maternal Education  20619 13.16 2.25 0  17
Married Parents  20619 0.70 0.42 0  1
Mom Smoke  20619 0.47 0.48 0  1
Number of Siblings  20619 1.63 1.48 0  14
Parent Works  20619 0.73 0.41 0  1
Religious Attendance (Times/year)  20619 24.53 20.92 0  50
Urban Status  20619 0.35 0.47 0  1
Rural Status  20619 0.24 0.43 0  1
Missing Family Information  20619 0.35 0.48 0  1
Impulsivity Scale  20437 3.00 1.13 1  5
Go with Gut: Strongly Disagree  20437 0.07 0.26 0  1
Go with Gut: Disagree  20437 0.33 0.47 0  1
Go with Gut: Neither  20437 0.21 0.41 0  1
Go with Gut: Agree  20437 0.29 0.46 0  1
Go with Gut: Strongly Agree  20437 0.09 0.29 0  1
Discount Rate Scale  20468 4.34 0.88 1  5
Almost No Chance Live to Age 35  20468 0.01 0.12 0  1
Some Chance Live to Age 35  20468 0.02 0.15 0  1
50-50 Chance Live to Age 35  20468 0.11 0.32 0  1
A Good Chance Live to Age 35  20468 0.31 0.46 0  1












Specification OLS  Poisson Negative  Binomial 
         
Log (Cigarette Tax)  -0.189**  -0.090**  -0.111** 
    (0.076) (0.039) (0.045) 
Age  0.385*** 0.245*** 0.287*** 
    (0.048) (0.009) (0.015) 
Male  0.278*** 0.168*** 0.248*** 
    (0.079) (0.054) (0.056) 
Black  -1.793*** -1.590*** -1.590*** 
    (0.169) (0.080) (0.106) 
Hispanic  -1.282*** -0.816*** -0.689*** 
    (0.220) (0.129) (0.125) 
Family Income  -0.003***  -0.002***  -0.001** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Maternal Education  -0.056**  -0.036**  -0.028 
    (0.025) (0.014) (0.018) 
Mom  Smoke  0.903*** 0.552*** 0.571*** 
    (0.102) (0.040) (0.048) 
Married  Parents  -0.393*** -0.227*** -0.273*** 
    (0.098) (0.046) (0.059) 
Number of Siblings  -0.051**  -0.028*  -0.042** 
    (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) 
Parent Works  0.092  0.054  -0.001 
    (0.094) (0.055) (0.063) 
Religious  Attendance -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
    (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban  0.014 0.009 0.064 
    (0.111) (0.072) (0.092) 
Rural    0.153 0.074 0.048 
    (0.131) (0.067) (0.071) 
Missing Information 
Dummy  0.186 0.116** 0.069 
    (0.116) (0.059) (0.069) 
Constant  -2.186*** -2.325*** -3.045*** 
    (0.582) (0.277) (0.296) 
Observations  20479 20479 20479 
      .  . 
***1%, **5%, *10%, Robust standard errors clustered at the school level  
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Table 3 
Differential Responses to Cigarette Taxes 
Evidence Using Finite Mixture Models 
Outcome  Number of Cigarettes Number of Cigarettes Number of Cigarettes  Number of Cigarettes
Specification  FMM FMM FMM FMM 
Component  First Second First Second 
Distribution  Poisson  Poisson  Negative Binomial  Negative Binomial 
Proportion of Component  0.86  0.14  0.87  0.13 
Mean of Number Cigarettes  0.16  7.94  0.29  5.8 
Log (Cigarette Tax)  -0.128*  -0.055  -0.185**  -0.057 
    (0.071) (0.037) (0.080) (0.041) 
Age  0.175*** 0.099*** 0.409*** 0.184*** 
    (0.023) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026) 
Male -0.038  0.205***  -0.022  0.326*** 
    (0.112) (0.052) (0.122) (0.056) 
Black  -1.515*** -0.712*** -2.941*** -1.057*** 
    (0.162) (0.107) (0.287) (0.145) 
Hispanic  -0.695** -0.362*** -1.378** -0.392*** 
    (0.274) (0.057) (0.564) (0.081) 
Family Income  0.000  -0.001**  -0.002  -0.002** 
    (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Maternal  Education  -0.012 -0.013 -0.059* -0.016 
    (0.018) (0.013) (0.031) (0.020) 
Mom Smkoe  0.637***  0.206***  1.200***  0.176 
    (0.105) (0.052) (0.107) (0.112) 
Married Parents  -0.157*  -0.065  -0.376***  -0.174*** 
    (0.094) (0.043) (0.117) (0.064) 
Number of Siblings  0.000  -0.011  -0.009  -0.041 
    (0.027) (0.015) (0.035) (0.025) 
Parent  Works  0.107 -0.025 0.166 -0.068 
    (0.114) (0.041) (0.112) (0.070) 
Religious  Attendance  -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.028*** -0.009*** 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Urban  0.017 0.008 -0.016 0.084 
    (0.146) (0.064) (0.115) (0.117) 
Rural   0.142  0.044  0.129  -0.006 
    (0.131) (0.060) (0.107) (0.076) 
Missing Information Dummy  0.095  0.064  0.203**  0.034 
    (0.102) (0.053) (0.097) (0.077) 
Constant -3.549***  1.135***  -5.258***  -0.236 
    (0.600) (0.385) (0.617) (0.522) 
Observations 20479  20479  20479  20479 
P-value of difference  0.079    0.174    
          
***1%, **5%, *10%, Robust standard errors clustered at the school level  
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Table 4 














FMM  Neg Bin  Neg Bin  Neg Bin  Neg Bin  Neg Bin  Neg Bin 
Specification  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample  Full Full Full Full  Family  Family 
Fixed  Effects  None None None None None  Family 
Go with Gut:  Strongly Disagree  -0.066***     -0.060***  -0.039***  -0.083***  -0.059* 
    (0.011)    (0.011) (0.006) (0.021) (0.034) 
Go with Gut: Disagree  -0.036***  -0.032***  -0.016***  -0.037*  -0.032 
    (0.006)    (0.007) (0.005) (0.021) (0.023) 
Go with Gut: Agree  0.053***    0.053***  0.025***  0.051**  0.001 
    (0.006)    (0.006) (0.005) (0.023) (0.023) 
Go with Gut: Strongly Agree  0.087***    0.086***  0.025***  0.089***  0.018 
    (0.011)    (0.010) (0.007) (0.032) (0.034) 
Almost No Chance Live to Age 35    0.070***  0.056**  0.009  0.090  0.018 
      (0.024) (0.022) (0.015) (0.055) (0.066) 
Some Chance Live to Age 35    0.121***  0.110***  0.045***  0.120***  0.056 
      (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.044) (0.045) 
50-50 Chance Live to Age 35    0.092***  0.083***  0.028***  0.068***  0.041 
      (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.020) (0.027) 
A Good Chance Live to Age 35    0.037***  0.035***  0.018***  0.036**  0.019 
      (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.018) 
Number  of  Cigarettes       0.073***  0.066*** 
         (0.003)  (0.003) 
Age  0.026*** 0.022*** 0.024***  0.000  0.022***  -0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
Male  -0.027** -0.022* -0.029**  -0.031*** -0.020  -0.023 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) 
Black  -0.150*** -0.157*** -0.160*** -0.044*** -0.162***     
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.019)     
Hispanic  -0.077*** -0.084*** -0.083***  -0.000  -0.063**     
    (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024)     
Maternal  Education  -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.002* -0.000     
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)     
Mom  Smoke  0.079*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.027*** 0.088***     
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014)     
Married  Parents  -0.024** -0.022** -0.021**  0.001  -0.017     
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016)     
Parent Works  0.016*  0.017*  0.018**  0.009*  0.015    
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012)     
Religious Attendance  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.000* -0.002*** -0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations  20138 20168 20058 20058  5295  5295 
R-squared  0.070 0.063 0.075 0.471 0.082 0.771 
                    
***1%, **5%, *10%, Robust standard errors clustered at the school level . Additional Controls:  Number of 




Descriptive Statistics: Family Sample 
Add Health Wave 1 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std  Dev  Min  Max  Difference
Number of Cigarettes  5439 1.76 5.18 0 95    
Cigarette Tax  5408 32.21 16.49 3 75  *** 
Vending Machine Ban  5408 0.84 0.36 0 1    
Age 5435 16.07 1.75 12 21  *** 
Male 5439 0.50 0.50 0 1     
Black 5439 0.25 0.43 0 1  *** 
Hispanic 5439 0.15 0.36 0 1  *** 
Family Income ($10,000s)  5439 43.80 36.39 0 800  *** 
Maternal Education  5439 13.10 2.21 0 17  ** 
Married Parents  5439 0.69 0.43 0 1  ** 
Mom Smoke  5439 0.48 0.48 0 1    
Number of Siblings  5439 1.91 1.59 0 13  *** 
Parent Works  5439 0.72 0.42 0 1  ** 
Religious Attendance  5439 24.80 21.13 0 50    
Urban Status  5439 0.34 0.47 0 1  * 
Rural Status  5439 0.26 0.44 0 1  *** 
Missing Family Information  5439 0.33 0.47 0 1  * 
Impulsivity Scale  5393 3.05 1.13 1 5  *** 
Go with Gut: Strongly Disagree  5393 0.06 0.24 0 1    
Go with Gut: Disagree  5393 0.33 0.47 0 1    
Go with Gut: Neither  5393 0.20 0.40 0 1    
Go with Gut: Agree  5393 0.31 0.46 0 1    
Go with Gut: Strongly Agree  5393 0.09 0.29 0 1    
Discount Rate Scale  5412 4.30 0.90 1 5    
Almost No Chance Live to Age 35  5412 0.02 0.13 0 1    
Some Chance Live to Age 35  5412 0.03 0.16 0 1    
50-50 Chance Live to Age 35  5412 0.12 0.32 0 1    
A Good Chance Live to Age 35  5412 0.31 0.46 0 1    
Almost Certain Live to Age 35  5412 0.53 0.50 0 1    
Final Column Tests for Differences with the Full Sample from Table 1 




Number Model FMM? Specification BIC Shares 
1 Poisson  No  Baseline  123254    
2 Negative  Binomial  No  Baseline  49647    
3 Poisson  2  component  Baseline  59887 86%,  14% 
4  Poisson  3 component  Baseline  52365  76%, 19%, 5% 
5  Negative Binomial  2 component  Baseline  49354  87%, 13% 
6  Negative Binomial  2 component  no taxes  49351  87%, 13% 
7  Negative Binomial  2 component  with vending  49368  87%, 13%  
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Table 3A 
Differential Responses to Cigarette Taxes 
Evidence Using a 3-Component Poisson Finite Mixture Model 
Outcome  Number of Cigarettes Number of Cigarettes Number of Cigarettes
Specification FMM  FMM  FMM 
Component First  Second  Third 
Distribution Poisson Poisson Poisson 
Proportion of Component  0.75  0.07  0.19 
Mean of Number Cigarettes          
Log (Cigarette Tax)  -0.081  -0.016  -0.037 
   (0.062)  (0.015)  (0.042) 
Age 0.264***  0.088***  0.220*** 
   (0.039)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Male -0.168  0.096***  0.092 
   (0.191)  (0.024)  (0.076) 
Black -12.924  -0.705***  -1.565*** 
   (8.106)  (0.079)  (0.120) 
Hispanic -1.338**  -0.192***  -0.566*** 
   (0.520)  (0.048)  (0.100) 
Family Income  0.001  -0.001***  -0.002*** 
   (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Maternal Education  0.010  -0.018*  -0.032* 
   (0.039)  (0.009)  (0.019) 
Mom Smkoe  1.263***  0.147***  0.473*** 
   (0.194)  (0.033)  (0.056) 
Married Parents  -0.169  -0.039  -0.124 
   (0.244)  (0.032)  (0.092) 
Number of Siblings  0.042  -0.025*  -0.022 
   (0.053)  (0.013)  (0.020) 
Parent Works  0.138  -0.015  0.063 
   (0.241)  (0.031)  (0.066) 
Religious Attendance  -0.020***  -0.005***  -0.012*** 
   (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Urban -0.099  0.001  -0.006 
   (0.236)  (0.039)  (0.088) 
Rural   0.193  -0.036  0.006 
   (0.163)  (0.031)  (0.078) 
Missing Information Dummy  0.324**  0.012  0.077 
   (0.138)  (0.023)  (0.051) 
Constant  -7.360*** 1.556*** -1.770*** 
   (1.149)  (0.207)  (0.472) 
Observations 20257  20257  20257 
P-value of difference         
BIC         
***1%, **5%, *10%, Robust standard errors clustered at the school level  
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Table 4A 














FMM  Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson 
Specification  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Sample  Full Full Full Full  Family  Family 
Fixed  Effects  None None None None None  Family 
Go with Gut:  Strongly Disagree  -0.047***     -0.042***  -0.021***  -0.044**  -0.027 
    (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.017)  (0.024) 
Go with Gut: Disagree  -0.031***    -0.027***  -0.010**  -0.027*  -0.026 
    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Go with Gut: Agree  0.042***    0.042***  0.013***  0.053***  0.012 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Go with Gut: Strongly Agree  0.064***    0.062***  -0.001  0.054**  -0.016 
    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
Almost No Chance Live to Age 35   0.076***  0.064***  0.015  0.108*  0.045 
      (0.024) (0.023) (0.014) (0.060) (0.049) 
Some Chance Live to Age 35    0.105***  0.096***  0.030**  0.119***  0.009 
      (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.033) (0.040) 
50-50 Chance Live to Age 35    0.082***  0.075***  0.019***  0.051***  0.003 
      (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.019) (0.022) 
A Good Chance Live to Age 35    0.028***  0.026***  0.009**  0.028**  0.017 
      (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.014) 
Number of Cigarettes        0.075***    0.071*** 
        (0.002)    (0.003) 
Age  0.024*** 0.021*** 0.023***  -0.002  0.022***  -0.005 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Male  -0.014 -0.011 -0.016  -0.018***  -0.008 -0.011 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.014) (0.013) 
Black  -0.093*** -0.100*** -0.102*** 0.017*** -0.099***     
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.016)     
Hispanic  -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 0.028***  -0.038**     
    (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.007) (0.016)     
Maternal  Education  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002* -0.000     
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)     
Mom  Smoke  0.046*** 0.048*** 0.045*** -0.008** 0.054***     
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)     
Married  Parents  -0.019** -0.017** -0.016**  0.006  -0.005     
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013)     
Parent  Works  0.011 0.012 0.013 0.003 0.009     
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010)     
Religious Attendance  -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001***  0.000 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  20138 20168 20058 20058  5295  5295 
R-squared  0.048 0.044 0.053 0.622 0.058 0.822 
                    
***1%, **5%, *10%, Robust standard errors clustered at the school level . Additional Controls:  Number of 
Siblings, Family Income, Urban Status, Rural Status, Missing Information Dummy, Constant 
 